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ABSTRACT 
This project examined some of the common constraints on reliable cognitive assessment for 
children over time.  Repeated measures design (n = 133) was with younger (5 & 6 year old, n = 
64) and older (7 & 8 year old, n = 69) children.  Results showed that children’s self-concepts 
moderated the test-retest reliability over extended intervals for younger and older children.  
Social self-categorizations moderated slightly the test-retest reliability for both age groups.  For 
younger children only, personal self-categorization and self-reported talking about items 
moderated the reliability.  In contrast, there were no moderators of test-retest reliability for 
shorter retest intervals. Other experiences, including recall, recognition and self-reported 
reflection on the content, did not moderate the test-retest reliability.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
From five- to seven-years of age are a productive time for children’s cognitive development; it is 
traditionally an excellent time to analyse cognitive change (White, 1965), particularly because 
“children’s thinking after age 7 seems to be different from their thinking before age 5” (in 
Sameroff & Haith, 1996, p. 3).  It is well-known that children’s cognitive functioning varies 
considerably with age to such an extent that younger and older children can seem quite distinct in 
terms of cognitive performance (White, 1996) and changes over time, particularly in cognition, 
are directly related to age (see Sameroff & Haith, 1996).  In their classic work, Baltes, Reese and 
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Nesselrode (1977) argued that age could be seen as an independent variable that affects a 
dependent variable, such as test performance. In a study of 6 to 12 year olds, van den Burg and 
Kingma (1999) found that age contributed to test performance in neuropsychological assessment.  
Consequently, it is assumed that younger children’s cognitive assessments are less stable because 
they are developing quickly.  
     In investigations of children’s rapidly changing cognitive ability (Sameroff & Haith, 1996), 
age should be a major consideration.  This means that age may provide a reference point for the 
analysis of change over time and it may influence test-retest reliability.  Yet the evidence is 
somewhat contradictory.  For example, Schuerger and Witt (1989) examined five intelligence 
tests from 34 separate studies in relation to test-retest reliability, and found that age had a 
significant effect on reliability.   However, Kelley-Gomez (1999) found in five- to eight-year olds 
that age did not alter test-retest reliability of a computerised version of a reasoning ability test.  In 
addition, Dyche and Johnson (1991) studied the test-retest reliability of auditory-verbal attention 
over a four-week interval and found that the noted practice effect was not related to age.  The 
most significant finding of Schuerger and Witt (1989) was an increase in reliability with age 
when testing intellectual functioning.   This argument led us to the main research question – Are 
factors that moderate test-retest reliability of cognitive assessments also distinct by age groups? 
     Understanding the test-retest reliability of assessments is critical in the selection of tests used 
in clinical practice. This is particularly important when the assessment outcomes are used in 
monitoring growth and recovery of children's cognitive functioning.  This applies in educational 
interventions that support children with learning difficulties, as well as clinical programs 
following accident or injury.  In other words, we need to account for any extraneous aspects that 
may routinely alter the reliability of assessment materials from one occasion to another.  These 
extraneous factors may alter the outcomes of assessment, making them not as reliable over time.  
We need to determine whether test scores have changed over time, and identify the possible 
sources of the change (see Hannan, 2005).  It is an essential first step to examine features of the 
instrument before examining features of the child in the testing situation. Standard psychometric 
methods are used to first check that any variations in test scores are not due to low test-retest 
reliability.   
    To identify additional factors that may impact on the reliability, Schuerger and Witt (1989) 
examined five intelligence tests from 34 separate studies. They found that age had a significant 
effect on reliability.  Other variables that may also alter the reliability of cognitive assessment is 
the focus of the current investigation.   
     The SYSTEMS School-Years Screening Test for the Evaluation of Mental Status was used 
because it provides reliable and valid indicators of children's general cognitive functioning (see 
Bornholt, Spencer, Fisher & Ouvrier, 2004; Ouvrier, Hendy, Bornholt & Black, 1999). The 
current study investigates the moderators of the reliability.  Previous studies have established the 
test-retest reliability of the SYSTEMS screening test, showing strong test-retest reliability and 
high cognitive functioning stability over varying test-retest intervals (see Spencer, Bornholt & 
Ouvrier, 2003).  We proposed that other aspects of children’s behaviour in the test-retest interval 
may also moderate the test-retest reliability.  This means that individual children may show lower 
or higher cognitive functioning test scores, for instance, where performance is moderated by self 
concepts or recall of the items. Spencer and Bornholt (2003) suggest the particular aspects of self-
knowledge that may moderate test-retest reliability. These include self-concepts that integrate 
aspects of performance, talent, effort and task difficulty, as well as children's self-categorizations 
about cognitive activities (see Bornholt, 2005a; Bornholt & Ingram, 2001).  Conventions of 
psychological assessment (see Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; Sattler, 2001) suggest other experiences 
that may alter the test-retest reliability. This could entail personal experiences such as children's 
memory of items including recall and recognition, and thinking about the items, as well as social 
experiences such as talking about items during the retesting intervals. 
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Background to the Project 
     We take a socio-ecological approach in understanding children's cognitive development (see 
Bornholt et al., 2004; Bjorklund, 1995; Bowes & Hayes, 1999; Morrison, Griffith & Frazier, 
1996) to focus on personal and social aspects of children's experiences that moderate reliability of 
cognitive assessments.  In principle, children's cognitive functioning is considered more broadly 
than actual performance. We contextualised our understanding of reliability as the responsiveness 
to experience of children's cognitive assessments, over time (see Bornholt, 2005b). 
 
Personal and Social Experiences 
     Recall and recognition.  Early research by Carmines and Zeller (1979) suggests that memory 
from initial interviews may influence responses at subsequent interviews.  There are many similar 
situations where children are assessed on repeated occasions, in clinical and educational settings.  
Clearly, children may recall or recognize items from previous testing sessions.  This could alter 
their scores, and support (or constrain) the correspondence between test scores over time, for 
some children and not others.  
     Memory can be tested in the form of recall or recognition of events or information.  We 
considered recall to involve two processes of retrieval where a cue is first recognized without 
prompting and can then be recalled at a later time (see Newcombe, 1996).  It is clear that recall 
may be cued (specific external cue given) or free (prompted only by a general request). Bjorklund 
(1995) suggested that some younger children are susceptible to suggestion in cued recall and may 
provide inaccurate information, so free recall is utilized in the current study.  Recognition is 
conceptualized here as a single process, which does not require generation of a full response, only 
a decision concerning the accuracy of the response (Ellis & Hunt, 1989).  Recognition occurs in 
tests when children can distinguish between old and new items (Bjorklund, 1995).  Development 
of recognition with age is of particular interest. Gross and Hayne (1999) found that five to six 
year old children could recognize and describe their own drawings after a one-year delay. 
Although Bjorklund (1995) suggests that recognition ability appears to change little with age, 
work by Markham, Howie and Hlavacek (1999) suggests that younger children obtain lower 
scores of recognition than older children. 
     Learning through reflection. Actively thinking and talking about information within testing 
intervals may moderate test reliability over time.  Bjorklund (1995) supported the notion that 
experience of a previous performance influences a second performance.  Alternatively, Nelson 
(1996) argues that changes in memory reflect changes in cognition through the use of language as 
a cognitive tool.  This means that actively thinking and talking about experiences may influence 
test scores over time and enable better performance. 
     The impact of time intervals.  If children remember the items due to personal and social 
experiences, then they would perform better on the test when re-administered after a short 
interval.  Anastasi (1988) suggests that four weeks is a satisfactory retest interval. She argues that 
if retest intervals are short, then more information would be recalled correctly.  It is hypothesized 
that increases in test information through recall, recognition, talking, and thinking about the items 
would increase the test reliability. So, it is important to establish whether children's memory and 
experience in a short or long retest interval alters test reliability.  In clinical testing, appropriate 
test-retest intervals would minimize score interference due to the memory of items.   We therefore 
compared short retest intervals of two weeks with the four-week interval suggested by Anastasi, 
and a longer 12-week interval for the effects of memory and experience of items on test 
reliability.     
     Personal and social aspects of the self.  Self awareness is an important consideration in the 
development of children’s cognitive functioning (see Spencer & Bornholt, 2003). We examined 
effects of children's self-concepts of their cognitive functioning (see Bornholt, Ouvrier, Black, & 
Hendy, 1999) as a moderator of test-retest reliability over time.  Substantial research in related 
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fields (e.g., Bornholt & Piccolo, in press; Brake & Bornholt, 2004; Eccles, Wigfield, Harold, & 
Blumfield, 1993; Bornholt & Ingram, 2001) considers self-concept about a wide range of 
activities such as reading, drawing, the body and movement.  For this project, reliable indicators 
of self concepts are provided by the ASK-KIDS Inventory that create and are created by 
children's participation in activities (Bornholt, 1997, 2004; 2005ab; Marsh, Debus & Bornholt, 
2005).  The ASK-KIDS model of self-concepts integrates aspects of the person in terms of 
performance, natural talent, effort, and task difficulty in relation to particular activities such as 
reading, number and drawing (Bornholt, 2005c), that is readily extended to other activities (see 
Brake & Bornholt, 2004).  This model was applied in the present project to indicate children’s 
self-concepts about cognitive activities.  It was expected that children's cognitive self-concepts 
are also moderators of test reliability. 
     Particular personal and social self-categorizations were also explored that may vary test scores 
from one assessment to another and alter test reliability.  From self-categorization approach, self 
concepts need to be considered in context, whether personal or social contexts (see Bornholt & 
Ingram, 2001; Bornholt & Piccolo, in press).  Personal self-categorizations are within the person 
such as variations and commonalities across time and content, given a sense of individuality.  For 
instance, thinking about ones performance at reading compared to drawing is personal 
categorization by content, and thinking about pervious and current social skills is a personal 
categorization over time. In addition, social self-categorizations rely on comparisons within and 
among many salient social groups such as gender, age and ability groups, given a sense of 
belonging socially.  Recent research uses correlational and experimental evidence to show the 
self-categorizations that support and constrain children's self-concepts and participation in 
cognitive, social and physical activities (Bornholt, 2000; Bornholt & Ingram, 2001; Bornholt & 
Piccolo, in press; Eccles et al., 1993).  For cognitive activities, the research suggests a social basis 
to children's self concepts about number activities, a stronger personal than social basis for 
drawing, and for children with reading difficulties (Bornholt & Ingram, 2001; Coleman & 
Bornholt, 2003).  We therefore explored the effects of both personal and social self-
categorizations about general cognitive activities on test-retest reliability. 
 
 
Summary 
     The main question is whether characteristics of the children and their experiences within the 
testing interval alter the test-retest reliability of children's cognitive assessment over time for 
younger and older children.  We considered the impact of memory and self-reported item 
reflection, self-concepts, personal and social self-categorizations on test-retest reliability and 
hypothesize that these aspects will moderate test-retest reliability. 
 
METHOD 
Research Design 
     We used a repeated measures design (Time A, Time B, Time C) to test children's cognitive 
functioning, recall, recognition, self-reported refection, self-concept and self-categorization.  
Time A provided a baseline indicator. At Time B, children were randomly allocated to retest 
intervals of two (Time B2), four (Time B4) or twelve weeks (Time B12).  Assessment at Time C 
(the third testing session) used a standard interval of four weeks from Time B.   
 
Research Sample 
     The children (n = 133) were aged between 5 to 8 years with a mean age of 6.6 (SD = 1.1) from 
primary schools in Sydney, Australia. For analysis purposes, the children were grouped as 
younger (5 & 6 year old, = 64) or older (7 & 8 year old, n = 69). The current sample consisted of 
young children who took part in a larger project, conducted by the Children’s Hospital at 
Westmead, with 5 to 12 year old children (N = 399).  The larger sample was drawn from six 
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schools randomly chosen from within a 20km radius of the Hospital from a variety of socio-
economic areas. The ABS (2001) Socio-Economic Indices for Areas – Index of Education and 
Occupation (SEIFA-IEO) was used to select schools from high, medium and low areas, which 
was representative of the general Sydney population. Permission was obtained from school 
principals and parents and the response rate of 49% was considered satisfactory.  Children up to 
the age of 8 years were selected for the current study, as past research has shown a ceiling effect 
at age 10 (Ouvrier, Goldsmith, Ouvrier, & Williams, 1993).  There were no sample manipulations 
of the larger sample in selecting the current study sample. Parents were notified in permission 
letters that their child might be tested on two subsequent occasions. There were 256 children aged 
5 to 8 years in the larger sample and only 52% of these were included in the current sample of 
133.  These children were randomly selected from the 256 Hospital study children with an equal 
consideration of gender to enable even numbers of boys and girls, 65 were boys and 68 were 
girls.  The sample included children from medium socio-economic areas (55%), some high areas 
(38%) and low areas (7%).  Preliminary analysis using MANOVA did not show significant 
difference between the means of the cognitive functioning scores for children by areas, F(4, 260), 
= .03, p >.05, or by gender F(2, 262), = 1.42, p >.05. So the samples were combined in 
subsequent analyses. 
   Sampling constraints. The entire study involved each child being tested on three occasions. 
Overall, there were 399 individual testing sessions with the maximum time span from the first 
(Time A) to the last occasion (Time C) of 4 months.  The minimum time span from Time A to a 
Time C was 6 weeks.  The testing took two years due to staggered testing and a few initial 
recruitment difficulties.  Although the test retest schedule in the design was quite complex, there 
were few occasions that varied the test interval by more than 1 or 2 days.  General practical 
constraints determined the sample size and the time taken to complete testing, for example 
sampling worked around school holidays, children being away from school on testing days and 
one child included in the project moved away from the school during the time span required for 
the study. 
 
Procedures 
     The project was approved by University, Hospital and State Government Education 
Department ethics committees.  After sample selection and permission procedures, standard 
testing procedures were followed for interviewing each child on every occasion incorporated 
evenly paced items, without feedback to the child about correct or incorrect responses, children 
were not told that they would be retested on another occasion. Children were told that there 
would be participating in some activities and that there were no right or wrong answers, just what 
they thought.  Table 1 shows when materials were administered, and sub-sample sizes. 
 
Table 1: Summary of variables, materials, sub-sample size and time of assessment 
  
Variables Sub-Sample Size Time of Assessment Materials 
Cognitive Functioning 133 A, B & C SYSTEMS 
Memory     
    (Recall & Recognition) 133 B & C Pre & Post questions 
Experience 
    (Thinking & Talking) 133 B & C Pre & Post questions 
Self-concept 133 A, B & C ASK-KIDS 
Self-categorization 84 C Post questions 
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Materials 
     Assessment of cognitive functioning.  The School-Years Screening Test for the Evaluation of 
Mental Status (SYSTEMS) (Ouvrier, Hendy, Bornholt & Black, 1999; 2000) is a 46-item 
screening test of cognitive functioning for children. It takes about 10 minutes to administer 
verbally in a one-to-one interview situation. The child uses a worksheet for three questions.  The 
test was administered according to the SYSTEMS form and manual (Ouvrier et al., 2000). Each 
item of the test is scored dichotomously (1) correct response and (0) incorrect response, and 
scores are summed.  The research reports that for Australian school children aged 4 to 12 years 
SYSTEMS is internally consistent (alpha = 0.92) for 4 to 11 year olds, test scores are unbiased by 
gender, F(1, 1011), = 0.75, p >.05, and socio-economic indicators F(2, 1010), = 0.16, p >.05 with 
strong inter-rater reliability (r = .94) (see Ouvrier et al., 1999).  Ouvrier et al. (1999) and Russell, 
Bornholt and Ouvrier (2002) also show strong correlations between test scores and full general 
cognitive assessments (rs =  .88 and .75, respectively) using the Stanford Binet (Thorndike, 
Hagan & Sattler, 1986) and the Differential Ability Scales (Elliott, 1990).  The screening test 
examines aspects of cognitive functioning, including orientation, attention, calculation, reading, 
comprehension, copying, writing and memory. An example of the test content is the immediate 
and delayed recall of the placement of an object.   
     Additional items.  For the current study, six false questions (different for each session B and 
C) were incorporated into the test to determine false answers at Time B and Time C.  These items 
were integrated into the test at various points. There were three false items before Question 1 and 
one each after Question 16, after Question 29 and after Question 37.  The false questions were 
distinct enough to be different from any previous items, for example at Time B in the spelling 
section children were asked to spell ‘Tamagotchi’.  This is quite a difficult and unusual question 
that they might remember from the previous administration.  According to Markham et al. (1999), 
it is appropriate to determine accurate recognition scores by subtract the number of false items 
each student purported to remember from the number of overall recognized items, this approach 
was taken in the current study.    
      Assessment of item memory and reflection.  Memory questions were used to determine the 
number of recalled items and then recognized items.   To test for any content recall, pre-test 
questions were administered at Time B and Time C prior to the administration of the cognitive 
functioning test.    When testing recall, children were initially asked, “What questions were you 
asked last time?” If any items were recalled the child was classified as having recall of items.   
     To test for any content recognition, while the Time B and C tests were being administered, 
children were asked after each item, “Do you remember this question from last time, or not?” The 
response of yes or no was noted.  
     Assessment of personal and social reflections.  At Time B and Time C, during the 
administration of the pre-test questions children were asked about their personal and social item 
reflections.  The children were asked, on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 being not at all), how much they 
thought about and talked about the item/s in between the two testing intervals.        
     Children’s self-concept about cognitive functioning.  Cognitive self concepts were adapted 
from the ASK-KIDS Inventory (Bornholt, 1997; 2005a). The ASK-KIDS Inventory includes 
children's self evaluations about ten common activities for children (reading, number, drawing, 
movement, body, appearance, individuality, belonging, friends and communication).  Responses 
use a five dot-point rating scale that is easy for young children to use.  Research showed reliable 
self concepts based on conventional indicators of internal consistency (alpha coefficients > .70) 
and good fit of the model to children's responses (Adj GFI > .95; ChiSq/df ratio < 2.0; RMSEA < 
.05) using confirmatory factor analyses (see Bornholt, 1997, 2005a; Bornholt & Ingram, 2001; 
Marsh, Debus & Bornholt, 2005).  
     After administration of the cognitive screening test children were asked five self concept items 
(e.g., ‘How good are you at these activities?’, ‘How difficult are these activities for you?’.   
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Responses were averaged (with reversed responses such as difficulty) to form self concepts from 
(1) low to (5) high.  
     Self categorizations about cognitive activities.  Personal and social self-categorizations 
questions were asked of each child at Time C.  Personal self-categorization addressed 
comparisons over time, ‘How good were you at these activities this time as compared to last 
time?’.  Social self-categorization addressed comparisons within age groups, ‘How good were 
you at these activities compared to other kids your age?’. Responses using the five dot-point 
ratings were from (1) low to (5) high. 
     Self categorizations about cognitive activities.  Personal and social self-categorizations 
questions were asked of each child at Time C.  The personal self-categorization addressed 
comparisons over time, “How good were you at these activities this time as compared to last 
time?”.  Social self-categorization addressed comparisons within age groups, “How good were 
you at these activities compared to other kids your age?” Responses using the five dot-point 
ratings were from (1) low to (5) high. 
 
Analyses 
     The cognitive functioning test-retest correlations were computed using Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients for each group.  Group comparisons included: recall of items (no and yes); 
recognition of items (low and high median split); thinking about items (no and yes); talking about 
items (no and yes); self-concepts (low and high by median split) and self-categorizations (low and 
high median split). Using a Fisher r-to-z transformation (Freed, Ryan & Hess, 1991, Vassar Stats 
web site http://faculty.vassar.edu/lowry/rdiff.html) the two person correlations were compared for 
each area of interest.  A probability level of p<.05 was considered as significant for this study.   A 
non-directional two-tailed test of significance was used in all analyses where Ho does not equal 
H1. 
     The main question was whether personal and social factors alter the test-retest reliability. 
Moderator variables control the statistical properties of the test is determined using the pearson 
correlation coefficients (reliability results) and the Fisher r-to-z transformation, which can 
provide a comparison that can determine statistically significant differences between two 
reliability results. 
 
RESULTS 
Recall and Recognition 
     With regard to the number of items each child recognized, the six false items were 
incorporated within the test to indicate false answers and to calculate an appropriate recognition 
score.  Table 2 reports the frequency of false answers for all children.  A t-test showed a 
significant difference between the means for the number of false answers at Time B and Time C 
t(131) = 1.92,  p > .05 (two tailed), d  = 0.16.  According to Cohen (1988) this shows a small 
difference between the two sample means being compared (Huck, 2004). The proportion of 
children giving false answers increased from 43% at Time B to 59% at Time C.   Chi square 
results showed no significant difference between the model (50% of children giving no false 
answers, 30% giving one or more and 20% giving 2 or more false answers) and the sample (Time 
B χ2 (2, N = 133 ) =3.34, p = >.05  and Time C χ2 (2, N = 132) = 5.29, p  > .05).   
In determining accurate recognition scores, for each child the number of false answers was 
subtracted from the number of recognized items reported at each testing occasion (Markham et 
al., 1999).   The results of Fisher r-to-z transformation in Table 3 and 4 showed that recognition 
and recall  did not affect the reliability of cognitive functioning over various time intervals.   
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Table 2: Frequency of false answers 
 
Number of  
False Answers 
Frequency  
at Time B 
Frequency  
at Time C 
0 
1 only 
2 or more 
Missing 
76 
29 
28 
           0 
54 
46 
32 
  1 
Total 133 132 
 
  
 
Table 3: Fisher r-to-z transformations of recall and recognition groups over varying intervals for 
younger children 
 
Variables Groups Time 
  A to B2  A to B4  A to B12  
  r z p  r z p  r z p  
Recall   
B 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.93 (7) 
 
.82 (14) 
1.37 ns 
.85 (14) 
 
.88 (9) 
-.24 ns      na   
           
Recognition 
B 
Low(Mdn 
<25) 
 
High(Mdn 
≥25) 
.95 (7) 
 
.83 (14) 
1.10 ns 
.87 (12) 
 
.87 (11) 
0.00 ns 
.88 (13) 
 
.95 (7) 
.77 ns 
  B to C  A to C  
  r z p  r z p 
Recall   
C 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.88 (38) 
 
.92 (26) 
-.79 ns 
.88 (38) 
 
.86 (26) 
.31 ns 
        
Recognition 
C 
Low(Mdn 
<34) 
 
High(Mdn 
≥34) 
.86 (32) 
 
.92 (32) 
1.13 ns 
.82 (32) 
 
.90 (32) 
1.20 ns 
sample number in brackets, na  = not available due to small numbers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCREENING CHILDREN'S COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING – SPENCER & BORNHOLT 99
Table 4: Fisher r-to-z transformations of recall and recognition groups over varying intervals for 
older children 
 
Variables Groups Time 
  A to B2  A to B4  A to B12 
  r z p  r z p  r z p 
Recall   
B 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.93 (8) 
 
.92 (16) 
.13 ns 
.91 (11) 
 
.86 (13) 
.49 ns 
.83 
(14) 
 
.93 (7) 
-.81 ns 
           
Recognition 
B 
Low(Mdn<37) 
 
High(Mdn ≥37) 
.97 (7) 
 
.87 (17) 
1.34 ns 
.82 (11) 
 
.91 (13) 
.78 ns 
.89 
(14) 
 
.76 (7) 
.73 ns 
  B to C  A to C  
  r z p  r z    p 
Recall   
C 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.85 (22) 
 
.87 (47) 
-.28 ns 
.85 (22) 
 
.86 (47) 
-.14 ns 
        
Recognition 
C 
Low(Mdn <43) 
 
High(Mdn ≥43) 
.88 (31) 
 
.86 (38) 
.33 ns 
.85 (31) 
 
.85 (38) 
0.00 ns 
sample number in brackets 
 
 
Self-Reported Thinking or Talking About Items 
     Many children self-reported thinking about the items between Time A and Time B, (45%) and 
between Time B and Time C (58%). Also, 22% and 35% of children reported talking about the 
items between Time A and B, and Time B and C respectively.  Individual variations in the extent 
to which children self-reported to think or talk to other people about the items within the testing 
intervals did not impact on the test-retest reliability of the screening test, except for younger 
children talking about the items, see Figure 5. 
 
Self-concept and Self-categorization 
     Moderation of the test-retest reliability by children's self-concepts is shown in Tables 7 and 8. 
The results show three significant differences in test-retest reliability between Time A and Time 
B2 (two week delay), between Time B to Time C and between Time A to C.  Although the test-
retest reliability remains strong for each of the sub-groups investigated, it appears that test-retest 
reliability is reduced where children compare their cognitive assessments to how good they are 
when comparing two time testing sessions.  Those with high self concepts overall tended to 
obtain lower reliability results than those children with lower self-concepts.   
     Table 9 and 10 reports the Fisher r –to-z transformations of personal and social self-
categorizations. The results show a significant difference in test-reliability results for social 
comparisons made between Time B and Time C for younger and older children.  Specifically, 
those children with low social self-categorizations tended to have lower test-reliability results 
than those with high levels of self-categorizations.  The results also show a significant difference 
in test-reliability results for personal comparisons for younger children. 
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Table 5: Fisher r-to-z transformations of self-reported thinking and talking groups over intervals, 
for younger children 
 
Variables Groups Time 
  A to B2  A to B4  A to B12 
  r z p  r z p  r z p 
Think 
B 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.82 (10) 
 
.96 (11) 
-1.52 ns 
.77 (8) 
 
.89 (15) 
-.75 ns 
.88 (12) 
 
.97 (8) 
-1.28 ns 
           
Talk  
B 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.90 (17) 
 
.89 (4) 
.05 ns 
.86 (10) 
 
.88 (7) 
-.13 ns na   
  B to C  A to C  
  r z p       r  z p 
Think 
C 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.91 (21) 
 
.90 (43) 
.19 ns 
.85 (21) 
 
.89 (43) 
-.58 ns 
        
Talk 
C 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.87 (44) 
 
.97 (20) 
2.63 .00 
.87 (44) 
 
.91 (20) 
-.67 ns 
sample number in brackets, na  = not available due to small numbers, bold = significant differences found 
 
 
Table 6: Fisher r-to-z transformations of self-reported thinking and talking groups over intervals, 
for older children 
 
Variables Groups Time 
  A to B2  A to B4  A to B12 
  r z p  r z p  r Z p 
Think 
B 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.94 (10) 
 
.94 (8) 
0.00 ns 
.82 (12) 
 
.91 (12) 
-.79 ns 
.85 (15) 
 
.89 (6) 
-.26 ns 
           
Talk 
B 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.93 (20) 
 
.94 (4) 
-.08 ns 
.83 (17) 
 
.93 (7) 
-.83 ns 
.75 (16) 
 
..89 (5) 
-.59 ns 
  B to C  A to C  
  r z p  r z p 
Think 
C 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.86 (35) 
 
.88 (34) 
-.33 ns 
.86 (35) 
 
.85 (34) 
.15 ns 
        
Talk 
C 
Nil 
 
Yes some 
.90 (42) 
 
.80 (27) 
1.44 ns 
.88 (42) 
 
.79 (27) 
1.17 ns 
sample number in brackets 
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Table 7: Fisher r-to-z transformations of self-concept groups over intervals, for younger children 
 
Variables Groups Time 
  A to B2  A to B4  A to B12 
  r z P  r z p  r z p 
Self-
Concept 
B 
Low(Mdn 
<4.6) 
 
High(Mdn
≥4.6) 
.94 (7) 
 
.82 (14) 
1.0 Ns 
.92 (11) 
 
.76 (12) 
1.22 ns 
.91 (11) 
 
.91 (9) 
0.00 ns 
           
  B to C  A to C  
  r z P  r z p 
Self-
Concept 
B 
Low(Mdn 
<4.6) 
 
High(Mdn
≥4.6) 
.94 (29) 
 
.84 (35) 
1.96 .02 
.85 (29) 
 
.88 (35) 
-.45 ns 
        
Self-
Concept  
C 
Low(Mdn 
<4.8) 
 
High(Mdn
≥4.8) 
.90 (31) 
 
.86 (33) 
.68 Ns 
.96 (31) 
 
.86 (33) 
2.48 .00 
sample number in brackets, bold = significant differences found 
 
Table 8: Fisher r-to-z transformations of self-concept groups over intervals, for older children 
 
Variables Groups Time 
  A to B2  A to B4  A to B12 
  r z P  r z p  r z p 
Self-
Concept 
B 
Low(Mdn 
<4.2) 
 
High(Mdn
≥4.2) 
.95 (9) 
 
.91 (15) 
.61 ns 
.82 (12) 
 
.90 (12) 
.67 ns 
.75 (8) 
 
.91 (13) 
1.01 ns 
  B to C  A to C  
  r z P  r z p 
Self-
Concept 
B 
Low(Mdn 
<4.2) 
 
High(Mdn
≥4.2) 
.90 (29) 
 
.85 (40) 
.84 ns 
.85 (29) 
 
.86 (40) 
.15 ns 
        
Self-
Concept  
C 
Low(Mdn 
<4.6) 
 
High(Mdn
≥4.6) 
.91 (34) 
 
.80 (35) 
1.70 .04 
.90 (34) 
 
.80 (35) 
1.48 ns 
sample number in brackets, bold = significant differences found 
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Table 9: Fisher r-to-z transformations of personal and social self-categorization groups over 
intervals, for younger children 
 
Variables Groups Time 
  B to C  A to C 
  r z P  r z p 
Personal  
Self 
Categ. 
Low(Mdn <5.0) 
 
High(Mdn≥5.0) 
.81 (10) 
 
.95 (32) 
1.67 .04 
.88 (10) 
 
.89 (32) 
.11 ns 
        
Social 
Self 
Categ. 
Low(Mdn <5.0) 
 
High(Mdn≥5.0) 
.79 (10) 
 
.96 (32) 
2.98 .02 
.85 (10) 
 
.91 (32) 
.64 ns 
sample number in brackets, bold = significant differences found 
 
 
Table 10: Fisher r-to-z transformations of personal and social self-categorization groups over 
intervals, for older children 
 
Variables Groups Time 
  B to C  A to C 
  r z P  r z p 
Personal  
Self 
Categ. 
Low(Mdn <4.0) 
 
High(Mdn≥4.0) 
.94 (61) 
 
.94 (23) 
0.00 ns 
.95 (61) 
 
.91 (23) 
1.17 ns 
        
Social 
Self 
Categ. 
Low(Mdn <4.0) 
 
High(Mdn≥4.0) 
.89 (26) 
 
.95 (58) 
165 .04 
.92 (26) 
 
.92 (58) 
0.00 ns 
sample number in brackets, bold = significant differences found 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
     This research project examined the moderators of test reliability for the SYSTEMS cognitive 
screening test.  The overall aim was to examine factors that are proposed to moderate the test-
retest reliability of cognitive assessment for children.  We included recall, recognition, self-
reported thinking and talking about the items, self-concept, personal self-categorization and social 
self-categorization as possible moderator variables. In summary, there were two main moderators 
of test-retest reliability for assessment using SYSTEMS cognitive screening - children’s self-
concepts and social self-categorizations.  
 The main finding was that for seven- and eight-year old children cognitive functioning test-
retest reliability was not moderated by many of the factors suggested in the literature. These 
included how much children remembered from previous testing and whether they thought or 
talked about the items. The key factors were self-concepts and social self-categorizations. This 
was similar for five- and six-year old children, for whom self-reported talking about the items and 
personal self-categorization also moderate the test-retest reliability.  
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Self concepts. How children evaluate themselves as cognitive self concepts moderates test-
retest reliability over extended intervals. Younger and older children with reported low self-
concepts had more stable test scores than children with high self-concepts whose test scores were 
more variable.   It appears that the younger and older children with low-self concepts may have 
been under-estimating how good they were at the cognitive activities. Their scores increased over 
time, with even more of a difference between scores than children with high self-concepts.  
Perhaps not being told why they were being re-tested had an impact on their self-concepts. 
Children may have thought that they did not perform well the first time and needed to be given 
the test again. This suggests that we need to communicate the purposes of testing, and particularly 
re-testing.  The older children’s experiences suggest better understanding initially.  Yet for the 
older children, this difference was also evident in the third testing session. 
 Self-categorizations. It seems that children’s experiences of cognitive assessments are not 
necessarily congruent with test scores.  As found in many other contexts (see Bornholt, 2005a; 
Brake & Bornholt, 2004), children may under- or over-estimate how good they are at cognitive 
assessments compared to other children their age.  In principle, how children categorise 
themselves personally and socially underpins children’s attitudes, intentions and behaviours (see 
Bornholt, 2005a). Recent research in educational and clinical settings shows individual variations 
and particular trends in such processes of self-categorization and justification (Bornholt, 2005b; 
Bornholt & Ingram, 2001; Bornholt & Piccolo, in press; Coleman & Bornholt, 2003).  In this 
context, age was relevant to how children think about cognitive assessments. It is useful to 
consider these self-categorization processes as forms of self-stereotyping that are vital to what 
motives children to participate in activities (Bornholt, 2005c).  In this context, retest reliability 
was higher and more stable over time for younger and older children with high social 
categorizations, than children with low social categorizations.   In addition, personal self 
categorizations over time were also important in test-retest reliability for younger children.  
Constant attention to children’s self categorizations highlight the key social-cognitive processes 
that are vital in each situation. We need to consider the role of content comparisons that children 
make, their ideas of traits that are relatively stable to varying over time, in addition to children’s 
social categorizations in terms of ability, age and gender groups. 
 
Conclusions  
 The results lead us to conclude that the SYSTEMS cognitive screening test is generally 
stable over time, and that we do not need to be unduly concerned about minor variations when 
using the screening test. The test can be applied particularly to situations that require close 
monitoring of children's cognitive functioning.  It is important that children understand our 
reasons for testing and particularly for re-testing. 
 In the main, the results confirmed that SYSTEMS is a sound indicator of children’s 
cognitive functioning, and test-retest reliability was not moderated by children's experiences in 
terms of memory (recall and recognition) and self-reported reflection (talking and thinking about 
items, except for younger children talking about the items).  Further research is warranted to test 
whether self-reported reflection underestimate the amount children spoke about the items that 
may reflect a desire to do well or not appear to be cheating.  The findings show that in general 
test-retest reliability was evident across people and situations.  In contrast to early suggestions by 
Carmines and Zeller (1979) and Bjorklund (1995), it appears that with brief indicators of 
cognitive functioning, that are psychometrically sound such as the SYSTEMS screening, the role 
of children's experience of previous performance is not of major importance.  This has 
significance for clinicians using cognitive tests over time to investigate changes in children’s 
functioning.   
 Further research is therefore warranted with other cognitive tests to confirm the findings 
with SYSTEMS screening test. The project covers many possible factors that may have altered 
retest reliability.  For now, the findings are specific to situations using SYSTEMS cognitive 
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screening.  We can speculate that the findings would also apply to similar assessments with 
appropriate full cognitive and other assessments, although test length would be a confounding 
factor with younger children and in clinical settings.  The findings make a valuable contribution 
to understanding the interesting variations and range of factors that may alter test-retest reliability 
for such brief cognitive assessments, and broaden the scope of applications in terms of individual 
qualities and situations that assessors routinely encounter in repeated cognitive assessments with 
children.  
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